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RECURSIVE AXIOMATIZATIONS FOR REPRESENTABLE
POSETS
ROB EGROT
Abstract. We use model theoretic techniques and games to construct explicit
first-order axiomatizations for the classes of posets that can be represented as
systems of sets, where the order relation is given by inclusion, and existing
meets and joins of specified countable cardinalities correspond to intersections
and unions respectively.
1. Introduction
Assuming the Axiom of Choice, or the weaker Prime Ideal Theorem, a lattice is
isomorphic to a sublattice of a powerset algebra if and only if it is distributive. If
S is a (meet) semilattice, it is always possible to embed S into a powerset algebra
via a semilattice embedding preserving arbitrary meets. For example, we can just
let X be the set of all down-sets of S, considered as a complete lattice, and take
h : S → X defined by h(a) = a↓, where a↓ = {b ∈ S : b ≤ a}.
The situation is more interesting if, in addition to the semilattice structure, we
also wish to preserve some or all of the joins existing in S. Balbes [1] showed that,
given n with 3 ≤ n ≤ ω, a semilattice embedding of S into a powerset algebra that
also preserves existing joins of cardinality strictly less than n exists if and only if,
for all k < n and x, y1, . . . , yk ∈ S, whenever
x ∧ (y1 ∨ . . . ∨ yk)
exists in S, so too does
(x ∧ y1) ∨ . . . ∨ (x ∧ yk),
and the two are equal. This result again requires some form of choice. Call a
semilattice with this property n-representable. Clearly n-representable implies m-
representable whenever m ≤ n, but, unlike in the lattice case, the converse does
not hold [9].
We can generalize to posets as follows. A poset P is (α, β)-representable if and
only if it can be embedded into a powerset algebra via an embedding preserving
meets of cardinality strictly less than α, and joins of cardinality strictly less than
β. For countable α and β, the class of (α, β)-representable posets is known to be
elementary [4, Theorem 4.5], but the proof does not produce an explicit axiomati-
zation. It is known that the class has a finite axiomatization only in trivial cases
[6].
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In the uncountable case, the class will not be elementary at all, except if either
α or β is equal to 2, in which case it is just the class of all posets [5]. In some cases
however the associated class is pseudoelementary. A summary of what is known
can be found in [5, figure 2].
In this paper we construct explicit first-order axiomatizations for the cases where
α and β are countable. The idea is to define a two player game such that a winning
strategy for a particular player corresponds to the existence of the required repre-
sentation for a given poset, then to write down first-order sentences corresponding
to the existence of such a strategy. We define a game for the case where α and β
are both equal to 3 in Section 3, and produce the associated axioms in Section 4.
We generalize to other choices of α and β in Section 5.
To prove the resulting axiomatizations work for uncountable posets we must
exploit the fact that first-order axiomatizations are already known to exist. This
neat trick has appeared several times in the literature. For a recent example, and a
result similar in spirit to the one proved here, see [7, Section 4], where it is used to
produce a recursive axiomatization for representable disjoint union partial algebras.
The full result as described above requires some form of choice. Section 6 expands
on this, and provides a countable analogue that does not require anything beyond
ZF. Also in this section we explain how the known cases of lattices and semilattices
relate to the general result for posets.
2. (α, β)-representable posets
This section summarizes some basic definition and results. We assume some
knowledge of order theory and model theory, in particular ultraproduct construc-
tions. Textbook exposition can be found in [3] and [8].
Let α and β be cardinals greater than or equal to 2.
Definition 2.1. If P and Q are posets, then a monotone map f : P → Q is an
(α, β)-morphism if:
(1) if S ⊆ P with |S| < α and
∧
S defined in P , then h(
∧
S) =
∧
h[S], and
(2) if T ⊆ P with |T | < β and
∨
T defined in P , then h(
∨
T ) =
∨
h[T ].
When an (α, β)-morphism is an order embedding we say it is an (α, β)-embedding.
Note that if at least one of α and β is strictly greater than 2 then monotonicity is
automatic. If α = β we sometimes just say, e.g. α-morphism.
Definition 2.2. A poset is (α, β)-representable if there is a set X and an (α, β)-
embedding h : P → ℘(X) (where ℘(X) is the power set of X , ordered by inclusion
and considered as a lattice). If α = β we may just say, e.g. α-representable.
Definition 2.3. An (α, β)-filter of P is an upset Γ ⊆ P such that:
(1) if S ⊆ Γ with |S| < α and
∧
S defined in P , then
∧
S ∈ Γ, and
(2) if T ⊆ P with |T | < β and
∨
T defined in P , then T ∩ Γ = ∅ =⇒
∨
T /∈ Γ.
If α = β we can just say, e.g. α-filter.
Theorem 2.4. A poset P is (α, β)-representable if and only if for every p 6≤ q ∈ P
there is an (α, β)-filter Γ with p ∈ Γ and q /∈ Γ.
Proof. If P is (α, β)-representable, by h : P → ℘(X) say, then {h−1(x) : x ∈ X} is a
separating set of (α, β)-filters. Conversely, a separating set of (α, β)-filters provides
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the base of a representation defined by
h(p) = {Γ ∈ ℘(P ) : Γ is an (α, β)-filter and p ∈ Γ}.

A dual version of this result holds for a suitable concept of ideals. See [4] for a
more thorough discussion.
Proposition 2.5. Let 2 ≤ α, β ≤ ω. Then the class of (α, β)-representable posets
is closed under the following constructions:
(1) Products.
(2) Ultraproducts.
(3) Ultraroots.
Proof. (1) Let I be an indexing set and suppose Pi is an (α, β)-representable poset
for all i ∈ I. Let x, y ∈
∏
I Pi and suppose x 6≤ y. Then there is j ∈ I such
that x(j) 6≤ y(j). By Theorem 2.4 there is an (α, β)-filter, Γj , with x(j) ∈ Γj
and y(j) /∈ Γj . For i ∈ I \ {j} define Si = Pi, and define Sj = Γj . It is
straightforward to check that
∏
I Si is an (α, β)-filter of
∏
I Pi containing x
and not y, and so the result follows from Theorem 2.4. Note that this proof
works for all 2 ≤ α, β, so α and β need not be countable.
(2) This is [4, Proposition 4.2], but we provide an alternative proof here. Given
an indexing set I, and (α, β)-representable posets Pi for each i ∈ I, we let U
be a non-trivial ultrafilter of ℘(I) and construct the ultraproduct
∏
U Pi. Now,
if [a] and [b] are elements of
∏
U Pi with [a] 6≤ [b], then {i ∈ I : a(i) 6≤ b(i)}
is equal to u for some u ∈ U . For each j ∈ u let Γj be an (α, β)-filter of Pj
with a(j) ∈ Γj and b(j) /∈ Γj (using Theorem 2.4). We extend the signature of
posets by a single unary predicate G, and we interpret G in Pj by
Pj |= G(x) ⇐⇒ x ∈ Γj
when j ∈ u. So, by definition of the ultraproduct,
∏
U Pi |= G([a]) and
∏
U Pi |=
¬G([b]). Now, for all j ∈ u, the fact that {x ∈ Pj : G(x)} is an (α, β)-filter
can be expressed in first-order logic using the signature of posets plus G, so, by
 Los´ Theorem [12], {[x] ∈
∏
U Pi : G([x])} is also an (α, β)-filter, and the result
follows from Theorem 2.4.
(3) This is [4, Proposition 4.4], and we can prove it quickly by observing that if
p 6≤ q ∈ P , and if [p¯] and [q¯] are the elements of the ultrapower
∏
U P defined
by the constant sequences, p¯(i) = p for all i ∈ I, and q¯(i) = q for all i ∈ I
respectively, then an (α, β)-filter of
∏
U P containing [p¯] and not [q¯] restricts to
an (α, β)-filter of the canonical image of P in
∏
U P .

Theorem 2.6. For all 2 ≤ α, β ≤ ω, the class of (α, β)-representable posets is
elementary.
Proof. This is [4, Theorem 4.5]. The class is obviously closed under isomorphism,
and since it is closed under ultraproducts and ultraroots, by Proposition 2.5 parts
(2) and (3) respectively, it is elementary by the Keisler-Shelah Theorem [10, 13]. 
Theorem 2.7. Given 2 ≤ α, β ≤ ω, the class of (α, β)-representable posets is
finitely axiomatizable if and only if at least one of α and β is 2.
4 RECURSIVE AXIOMATIZATIONS FOR REPRESENTABLE POSETS
Proof. If both α and β are strictly greater than 2, then that the class is not finitely
axiomatizable is the main result of [6]. Conversely, if β = 2, then given p 6≤ q ∈ P
we can always take p↑ as an (α, β)-filter containing p but not q, and, if α = 2,
we can take P \ {q↓} for the same purpose. Thus in these cases every poset is
(α, β)-representable, by Theorem 2.4. 
Proposition 2.8. The class of (α, β)-representable posets is not closed under sub-
structures when both α and β are strictly greater than 2.
Proof. See Example 2.10 below. 
Corollary 2.9. The class of (α, β)-representable posets has no universal axioma-
tization when both α and β are strictly greater than 2.
Proof. A class is universal if and only if it is closed under isomorphisms, ultraprod-
ucts and substructures (see e.g. [2, Theorem 2.20]). 
Note that, by the easy part of the proof of Theorem 2.7, if one or both of α and
β is 2, then the class of (α, β)-representable posets is just the class of all posets,
which is universally axiomatized by definition.
Example 2.10. Let P be the poset in figure 1. Then it’s straightforward to check
that P is (α, β)-representable, by using Theorem 2.4, or just by writing down a
suitable representation. However, the substructure with base {a, b, c,⊤,⊥} is order
isomorphic to the diamond lattice M3, and so is not distributive.
•⊤
•
•
•a •b •c
•⊥
❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈
④④④④④④④④
Figure 1.
3. A game for 3-representations
We define a family of two player games, played over a poset P , between players
∀ and ∃. The games are played in rounds indexed by the natural numbers. In each
round, ∀ plays a move, then ∃ plays a move. The choices ∃ makes add elements
to a set U whose initial state is dependent on the game. ∃ wins an n-round game
if ∀ does not win till at least round n + 1. ∃ wins an ω-round game if ∀ does not
win at any point during play. The idea is that, given p 6≤ q ∈ P , and a suitable
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sequence of moves by ∀, a winning play by ∃ in one of these games constructs a
3-filter containing p but not q.
Our games are played as follows. Every game has a starting position, taking the
form of a pair of sets U and V . In every round of the game ∀ makes one of the
following moves (for a, b ∈ P ):
(1) If b ≥ a, for some a ∈ U , then ∀ can play (b).
(2) If a, b ∈ U , and a ∧ b is defined in P , then ∀ can play (a, b).
(3) If a ∨ b is defined and in U , then ∀ can play (a, b).
∃ must respond to each move according to the following rules (one for each
possible move by ∀):
(1) ∃ must add b to U .
(2) ∃ must add a ∧ b to U .
(3) ∃ must choose either a or b and then add it to U .
∀ wins in round n if U ∩ V 6= ∅ at the beginning of that round. ∃ has an n-
strategy for the game with starting position (U, V ) if she can guarantee that she
will not lose this game till at least round n+1, however ∀ plays. ∃ has an ω-strategy
for the game with starting position (U, V ) if she can guarantee to never lose this
game, whatever moves ∀ makes. Note that if U ∩ V 6= ∅ in the starting position
then ∃ will lose in round 0.
Proposition 3.1. If P is 3-representable then, for all p 6≤ q ∈ P , ∃ has an ω-
strategy in the game for P with starting position ({p}, {q}). If P is countable then
the converse is true.
Proof. If P is 3-representable then, whenever p 6≤ q ∈ P , there is a 3-filter Γ
containing p and not q (by Theorem 2.4). In this case ∃ has an ω-strategy where
she only picks elements from Γ.
Conversely, suppose P is countable, and suppose that ∃ has an ω-strategy for the
game with starting position ({p}, {q}), whenever p 6≤ q ∈ P . We define a strategy
for ∀ as follows. Fix an arbitrary 1-1 map v : P × P → N. We say a move ∀ can
make is good if one of the following holds:
(1) The move is type 1 and b /∈ U .
(2) The move is of type 2 and a ∧ b /∈ U .
(3) The move is of type 3 and neither a nor b is in U .
We rank the moves that could potentially be played by ∀ using the following system:
(1) If (b) is a move of type 1 then the rank of (b) is v(b, b).
(2) If (a, b) is a move of type 2 or 3 then the rank of (a, b) is v(a, b).
In each round ∀ plays the good move with the lowest rank. If no good move exists
then ∀ just plays the type 1 move (p) for the rest of the game. Then the set U
constructed during this game is a 3-filter, because, once a good move has become
available for ∀, either he plays it within a finite number of moves, or it stops being
a good move after a finite number of rounds.
Only good moves are relevant to the question of whether U is a 3-filter, so during
the course of this game, if ∃ plays according to her ω-strategy, every potential
obstacle to U being a 3-filter is removed. Since U contains p and not q by definition,
after an appeal to Theorem 2.4 we are done. 
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4. Axioms for winning games
We can easily use the signature of posets to write down (universal) formulas J
andM , with free variables x, y and z, such that an interpretation of J(x, y, z) holds
in P if and only if the interpretation of z is the join of the interpretations of x and
y, and an interpretation of M(x, y, z) holds in P if and only if the interpretation of
z is the meet of the interpretations of x and y.
Given k ∈ ω, we can also write down a (quantifier free) formula Ck, with free
variables (x1, . . . , xk, y), such that an interpretation of Ck(x1, . . . , xk, y) holds in P
if and only if the interpretation of y is equal to the interpretation of xi for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Similarly, we can write down a (quantifier free) formulaDk such that
an interpretation of Dk(x1, . . . , xk, y) holds in P if and only if the interpretation of
y is distinct from the interpretation of xi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. So C0 just defines
the empty set, and D0 is satisfied by all elements, though this is not significant in
the proof. Note also that Dk = ¬Ck.
For all m,n ∈ ω we use ~xm to denote the m-tuple (x1, . . . , xm), and we define
formulas φmn, with m+ 1 free variables, by recursion as follows.
φm0(~xm, y) = Dm(~xm, y).
φm(n+1)(~xm, y) =
∀ab
((
(∃c(Cm(~xm, c) ∧ (c ≤ a))→ φ(m+1)n(~xm, a, y)
)
∧
(
(Cm(~xm, a) ∧ Cm(~xm, b) ∧ ∃cM(a, b, c))→ φ(m+1)n(~xm, c, y)
)
∧
(
∃c(Cm(~xm, c) ∧ J(a, b, c))→ (φ(m+1)n(~xm, a, y) ∨ φ(m+1)n(~xm, b, y))
))
.
Lemma 4.1. Let P be a poset, and let v be an assignment of variables to elements
of P . Then, for all m,n ∈ ω,
P, v |= φmn(~xm, y) ⇐⇒ ∃ has an n-strategy for the game with
starting position ({v(x1), . . . , v(xm)}, {v(y)}).
Proof. Given a tuple of variables ~xm = (x1 . . . , xm), if we abuse notation slightly
and define v[~xm] = {v(x1), . . . , v(xm)}, then, by definition,
P, v |= φm0(~xm, y) ⇐⇒ v[~xm] ∩ {v(y)} = ∅,
which is equivalent to saying that ∃ has a 0-strategy in the game with starting
position (v[~xm], {v(y)}). The result then follows by inspection of the formula φmn
and induction on n. To see this note that, applying the inductive hypothesis, we
have P, v |= φm(n+1)(~xm, y) if and only if, whatever move ∀ makes first in the game
with starting position (v[~xm], {v(y)}), ∃ can respond with a move (a) in such a
way that she has a winning strategy for the n-round game with starting position
(v[~xm] ∪ {a}, {v(y)}). But this is equivalent to saying that ∃ has a strategy for
the (n + 1)-round game with starting position (v[~xm], {v(y)}). In other words,
P, v |= φm(n+1)(~xm, y) if and only if ∃ has an (n + 1)-strategy for the game with
starting position (v[~xm], {v(y)}), as required. 
Now, for each n ∈ ω we define sentences as follows.
ψn = ∀xy((x 6≤ y)→ φ1n(x, y)).
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Proposition 4.2.
P |= ψn ⇐⇒ for all p, q ∈ P , if p 6≤ q then ∃ has an n-strategy
for the game with starting position ({p}, {q}).
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 4.1. 
Theorem 4.3. Let P be a poset. Then P has a 3-representation if and only if
P |= ψn for all n ∈ ω.
Proof. If P is 3-representable then it has a separating set of 3-filters, by Theorem
2.4. So, given p 6≤ q ∈ P , ∃ can pick a 3-filter, Γ, containing p but not q, and win
the ω-game with starting position ({p}, {q}) just by always picking elements of Γ.
That P |= ψn for all n ∈ ω then follows directly from Proposition 4.2.
For the converse, suppose first that P is countable, and that P |= ψn for all
n ∈ ω. Then, by Proposition 4.2, whenever p 6≤ q ∈ P , ∃ has an n-strategy for the
game with starting position ({p}, {q}). It follows from Ko¨nig’s Tree Lemma [11]
that ∃ has an ω-strategy for the game with starting position ({p}, {q}). Thus P is
3-representable by Proposition 3.1.
To complete the proof we use a trick. If P is uncountable then it has a countable
elementary substructure, P ′, by the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. Since
P ′ |= ψn for all n ∈ ω, we have just shown that P
′ must be 3-representable. But
the class of 3-representable posets is elementary, by Theorem 2.6. So, as P and P ′
are elementarily equivalent, it follows that P is 3-representable too. 
The axiomatization we have generated for the class of 3-representable posets
is clearly recursively enumerable, and so by Craig’s trick there is also a recursive
axiomatization for this class. Note that Craig’s trick should not be confused with
the Interpolation Theorem (see e.g. [8, Exercise 6.3.1] for the trick we use here, in
case it is unclear).
5. Generalizing
We can generalize the approach taken in Sections 3 and 4 to (α, β)-representations,
for all 2 ≤ α, β ≤ ω. This requires a straightforward modification of the game rules.
Definition 5.1 ((α, β)-game). Let P be a poset, let U, V ⊆ P , and let 2 ≤ α, β ≤
ω. The (α, β)-game with starting position (U, V ) is defined similarly to the game
defined in Section 3. ∀ has the following choices:
(1) If b ≥ a, for some a ∈ U , then ∀ can play (b).
(2) If A ⊆ U with |A| < α, and if
∧
A is defined in P , then ∀ can play A.
(3) If B ⊆ P with |B| < β, and if
∨
B is defined in P and is in U , then ∀ can
play B.
∃ must respond according to the following rules:
(1) ∃ must add b to U .
(2) ∃ must add
∧
A to U .
(3) ∃ must choose some b ∈ B and add it to U .
Proposition 5.2. Let P be a poset, and let 2 ≤ α, β ≤ ω. Then, if P is
(α, β)-representable, ∃ has an ω-strategy in the (α, β)-game with starting position
({p}, {q}) for all p 6≤ q ∈ P . Moreover, if P is countable then the converse is true.
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Proof. The proof of Proposition 3.1 can easily be adapted. In the case where either
α or β is 2 then P is always (α, β)-representable, and consequently ∃ always has an
ω-strategy for the necessary starting positions. 
Given 2 ≤ α, β < ω, we can follow the approach of Section 4 and write down
first-order sentences equivalent to ∃ having an n-strategy in the (α, β)-game with
starting position ({p}, {q}) for all p 6≤ q ∈ P . A result analogous to Theorem 4.3
can be proved for these using the same techniques as before, though a little more
care is required when defining the axiomatizing first-order theory. The case where
one or both of α, β is ω requires a slight modification of the approach.
We extend the notation from Section 4 as follows.
• For all 1 ≤ k < ω let Jk(~xk, y) and Mk(~xk, y) be first-order formulas that
hold in a poset P under assignment v if and only if v(y) =
∨
v[~xk] and
v(y) =
∧
v[~xk] respectively.
• For all 1 ≤ k,m < ω, let Ckm(~xk, ~ym) be a first-order formula that holds
in P under assignment v if and only if v[~ym] ⊆ v[~xk].
• For all 1 ≤ k,m < ω, let Dkm(~xk, ~ym) be a first-order formula that holds
in P under assignment v if and only if v[~ym] ∩ v[~xk] = ∅.
For all 1 ≤ k, r, s < ω define the following formulas.
σk(~xk, c) = ∃z
(
Ck(~xk, z) ∧ (z ≤ c)
)
.
τkr(~xk,~ar, c) = Ckr(~xk,~ar) ∧Mr(~ar, c).
ρks(~xk,~bs) = ∃z
(
Ck(~xk, z) ∧ Js(~bs, z)
)
.
Now, for all 1 ≤ k, r, s < ω and for all n ∈ ω we define formulas φkrsn using
recursion.
φkrs0(~xk, y) = Dk(~xk, y).
φkrs(n+1)(~xk, y) =
∀~ar∀~bs∀c
((
σk(~xk, c)→ φ(k+1)rsn(~xk, c, y)
)
∧
(
τkr(~xk,~ar, c)→ φ(k+1)rsn(~xk, c, y)
)
∧
(
ρks(~xk,~bs)→
s∨
i=1
φ(k+1)rsn(~xk, bi, y)
))
.
Lemma 5.3. Let P be a poset, and let v be an assignment of variables to elements
of P . Then, for all n ∈ ω and 1 ≤ k, r, s < ω,
P, v |= φkrsn(~xk, y) ⇐⇒ ∃ has an n-strategy for the (α, β)-game with
starting position (v[~xk], {v(y)})
for all 2 ≤ α ≤ r + 1 and 2 ≤ β ≤ s+ 1.
Proof. This is essentially the same as the proof for Lemma 4.1. 
Now, for all n ∈ ω, and for all 1 ≤ r, s < ω, define
ψrsn = ∀xy((x 6≤ y)→ φ1rsn(x, y)).
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Proposition 5.4. Let 1 ≤ α, β < ω.
P |= ψαβn ⇐⇒ for all p, q ∈ P , if p 6≤ q then ∃ has an n-strategy
for the (α+ 1, β + 1)-game with starting position ({p}, {q}).
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 5.3. 
Theorem 5.5. Let P be a poset, and let 2 ≤ α, β < ω. Then P has an (α, β)-
representation if and only if P |= ψ(α−1)(β−1)n for all n ∈ ω.
Proof. This is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 4.3. 
If we allow α and β to take the value ω then we must modify the approach
slightly, and use more axioms.
Theorem 5.6. Let P be a poset, and let 2 ≤ α, β ≤ ω. Then P has an (α, β)-
representation if and only if P |= ψrsn for all n ∈ ω and for all 1 ≤ r < α and
1 ≤ s < β.
Proof. If P is (α, β)-representable then ∃ has an ω-strategy for all the necessary
games, as in the proof of Theorem 4.3, and so one direction of the result follows
from Proposition 5.4.
For the converse, we follow the pattern of the proof of Theorem 4.3, and assume
first that P is countable. By Proposition 5.4 and Ko¨nig’s Tree Lemma we know
that, for all 2 ≤ r < α and 2 ≤ s < β, ∃ has an ω-strategy for the (r, s)-game with
starting position ({p}, {q}) whenever p 6≤ q ∈ P .
It follows that ∃ has an ω-strategy for the (α, β)-game with starting position
({p}, {q}) whenever p 6≤ q ∈ P . This is also a consequence of the Tree Lemma. If
∃ does not have an ω-strategy for some p 6≤ q, then there must be a bounded game
tree for this starting position, and so ∀ has a strategy that forces a win within a
finite number of rounds. But then the size of sets he plays in this winning strategy
must be bounded. It follows that there are l < α and k < β such that ∀ can force a
win in the (l, k)-game with starting position ({p}, {q}). But this is a contradiction
as we have already proved that ∃ has an ω-strategy in this game.
From here the proof proceeds exactly like that of Theorem 4.3. 
6. Lattices, semilattices and choice
As discussed in the introduction, the cases where P is a lattice or a semilattice are
well understood. Using the terminology of Section 2, a lattice is (α, β)-representable
for all 3 ≤ α, β ≤ ω if and only if it is distributive, and a meet semilattice is (α, β)-
representable for given 2 ≤ β ≤ ω and all 2 ≤ α ≤ ω if and only if it is β-distributive
as defined in Definition 6.1 below.
It is natural to ask how the known axiomatizations for distributive lattices and
n-distributive semilattices relate to the axiomatizations produced using the game
technique described here. Proposition 6.2 provides an answer to this.
Definition 6.1. Let S be a meet semilattice, and let 2 ≤ β ≤ ω. Then S is
β-distributive if, for all m < β, and for all and x, y1, . . . , ym ∈ S, whenever
x ∧ (y1 ∨ . . . ∨ ym)
exists in S, so too does
(x ∧ y1) ∨ . . . ∨ (x ∧ ym),
and the two are equal.
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Proposition 6.2. Let S be a meet semilattice, and let 2 ≤ k ≤ ω. Then the
following are equivalent:
(1) ∃ has an ω-strategy in the (m, k)-game with starting position ({a}, {b}) for all
a 6≤ b ∈ S, and for all 2 ≤ m ≤ ω.
(2) ∃ has a 5-strategy in the (3, k)-game with starting position ({a}, {b}) for all
a 6≤ b ∈ S.
(3) S is k-distributive.
Proof.
(1) =⇒ (2): Automatic.
(2) =⇒ (3): If S is not k-distributive then k > 2, and there must be m < k
and x, y1, . . . , ym ∈ S such that x ∧ (y1 ∨ . . . ∨ ym) is defined and, either
(x ∧ y1) ∨ . . . ∨ (x ∧ ym) is not defined, or
(x ∧ y1) ∨ . . . ∨ (x ∧ ym) < x ∧ (y1 ∨ . . . ∨ ym).
In either case there must be z ∈ P with z ≥ (x∧yi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and x∧(y1∨. . .∨ym) 6≤ z. Thus ∀ can force a win in the game with starting
position ({x∧ (y1∨ . . .∨ym)}, {z}) by the start of the 5th round by playing
according to the following strategy. First he plays the type 1 moves (x),
and (y1 ∨ . . . ∨ ym), and ∃ must respond by adding these elements to U .
Then ∀ plays the type 3 move {y1, . . . , ym}, and ∃ must respond by adding
yi to U for some i. Then ∀ plays the type 2 move {x, yi}, and ∃ must
respond by adding x∧ yi to U . Finally, ∀ plays the type 1 move (z), which
forces ∃ to add z to U , and thus ∀ wins at start of the 5th round.
(3) =⇒ (1): Let S be k-distributive, and let a 6≤ b ∈ S. Suppose ∃ does not
have an ω-strategy for the game with starting position ({a}, {b}). Then, in
particular there must be no (ω, k)-filter containing a and not b, as otherwise
this filter would provide an ω-strategy for ∃. But a version of the Prime
Ideal Theorem for semilattices is a consequence of the Axiom of Choice
(AC) when S is k-distributive (see [1, Theorem 2.2]), and so it follows
that AC is false. Thus we have disproved AC in ZFC, which is of course
impossible if ZFC is consistent.

Proposition 6.2 and Theorem 5.5 produce a finite axiomatization for the class
of (ω, β)-representable meet semilattices whenever 2 ≤ β < ω. Note that while we
have shown that a meet semilattice is ω-distributive if and only if ∃ has a 5-strategy
in the associated (3, ω)-games, this does not produce a finite axiomatization for the
class of (ω, ω)-representable semilattices, which we know does not exist [9]. This
is because we must use Theorem 5.6, and here an infinite number of axioms are
needed even to characterize the existence of a 5-strategy for ∃.
Corollary 6.3. Let L be a lattice. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) ∃ has an ω-strategy in the (m, k)-game with starting position ({a}, {b}) for all
a 6≤ b ∈ L, and for all 3 ≤ m, k ≤ ω.
(2) ∃ has a 5-strategy in the (3, 3)-game with starting position ({a}, {b}) for all
a 6≤ b ∈ L.
(3) L is distributive.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from Proposition 6.2. 
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Note that we refer to AC in the proof of Proposition 6.2, but the proof does not
depend on its assumption, so this proposition is a theorem of ZF.
Of course, in general, to deduce the existence of an ω-strategy from the existence
of an n-strategy for all n we require some choice principle, as this is necessary in
the proof of Ko¨nig’s Tree Lemma. The axiom of countable choice for finite sets,
for example, is always sufficient. In the proof of Theorem 4.3, the Tree Lemma is
applied to a countable set, so the necessary version is a theorem of ZF (indeed, the
full power of ZF is not needed - see [14, Chapter III.7]). However, to complete the
proof of Theorem 4.3 we rely implicitly on the Keisler-Shelah Theorem.
The following result however can be proved without any choice.
Proposition 6.4. Let 2 ≤ α, β ≤ ω. Then there is a recursive set of first-order
sentences Θ, such that whenever P is a countable poset we have
P |= Θ ⇐⇒ P is (α, β)-representable.
Proof. Let Θ be recursive set of sentences used in either Theorem 5.5 or 5.6, de-
pending on whether either α or β is ω. We can proceed more or less as in the proofs
of these theorems. The points of departure being that, as P is countable, we only
need the countable version of the Tree Lemma, which, as mentioned previously, is a
theorem of ZF, and we don’t need to use the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem + Keisler-Shelah
trick. 
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